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DOMESTIC

RELATIONS-TENTATIVE

REQUIREMENT

OF

DISCLOSURE

AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR MARITAL AGREEMENTS-In re

Mar-

riage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 569 P.2d 790 (1977).
Plaintiff husband and defendant wife executed three property
status agreements during their marriage after discovering that the wife
had multiple sclerosis.' The couple's personal and business counsel
drafted the agreements to minimize the wife's death and estate taxes.
Before signing the agreements, the wife received advice from the family counsel and travelled to her husband's properties. In addition, the
wife engaged another attorney to examine the agreements, but he declined to give her advice because she failed to provide him with necessary information. The husband obtained a dissolution decree
embodying the agreements. 2 On appeal, the Washington Supreme
Court held (5-3) that the agreements were valid. 3 In re Marriage of
Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790 (1977).
Hadley tested the validity of property status agreements executed
between a husband and wife. 4 The court ostensibly determined the va-

1. The husband, at the time of the marriage, had substantial assets which greatly
increased during the marriage. The wife owned no property of significant value before
the marriage or at the time of the dissolution. In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d
649, 651-52, 565 P.2d 790, 790-92 (1977).
2. The trial court accepted the agreements as validly characterizing the property
as separate or community; the decree reflected that characterization. Id. at 654, 565
P.2d at 793.
3. The court also ruled on matters outside the scope of this note, including the
trial court's abuse of discretion, the wife's waiver of her right to appeal by accepting
the benefit of the decree, the trial court's failure to list and assign each of the properties
as separate or community, the trial court's failure to assign a value to each of the
Hadley assets and distribute a tax reserve fund to either party, the trial court's substitution of future maintenance payments for the wife's community property interest, and
the award of attorney's fees to the wife.
4. Property status agreements may be either postnuptial or antenuptial. Postnuptial agreements are those entered into after marriage between couples still married.
Such agreements may be in the form of either a property settlement when the parties do not intend to separate or initiate divorce, or one in contemplation of separation
or divorce. An antenuptial agreement is one entered into prior to marriage by prospective spouses, usually delineating the property rights of both or of their children.
Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 298-99, 494 P.2d 208, 212 (1972); 2 A.
LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90, at 22-23 (rev.

ed. 1967); 1 NV. NELSON, DIVORCE & ANNULMENT § 13.03-.06 (2d ed. 1945). Postnuptial
and antenuptial property status agreements are executed between parties whose
relationship involves trust and confidence, and therefore provides a greater opportunity
for one party to gain advantage. Courts have generally described the marital or antenuptial relationship as confidential rather than as fiduciary. See, e.g., Friedlander,80
Wn. 2d at 301, 494 P.2d at 213; Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851, 865, 272 P.2d
125, 132 (1954); In re Estate of Madden, 176 Wash. 51, 53, 28 P.2d 280, 281 (1934).
See also Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967); In re Strickland's Estate,
181 Neb. 478, 149 N.W.2d 344 (1967); Lightman v. Magid, 54 Tenn. App. 701, 394
S.W.2d 151 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2, Comment b (1959) ("Al-
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lidity of the agreements under previously established principles that
full disclosure of the amount, character, and value of the property involved must be made to the wife, and that the agreements must be entered into voluntarily on independent advice and with full knowledge
5
of rights.
Prior to Hadley, the Washington Supreme Court had required strict
compliance with the elements of disclosure and independent advice
for a marital contractual transaction to be enforceable. 6 The purpose
of this note is to determine the effect of Hadley on those requirements.
First, it will examine the case law which resulted in the formalistic
test. Then, it will analyze this test as applied in Hadley, in which the
court assessed the fairness of the agreement by employing a balancing
approach instead of following the strict test. The note will focus on
the confusion which results when the court's actual application is at
variance with the standards it articulates. The discussion concludes
that the court should clearly establish whether a balancing test or a
formal requirements test will govern such transactions.
I. PRIOR CASE LAW
Washington law dealing with standards for valid marital agreements was unsettled prior to Hadley. The Hadley court cited two
cases, Hamlin v. Merlino7 and Friedlanderv. Friedlander,8 as setting
forth the applicable standards. 9 Hamlin established a test whereby the
though the relation is not a fiduciary relation, it may, nevertheless, be a confidential
relationship . . particularly likely to exist where there is a family relationship .. ")
The dissent in Hadley, however, describes the marital relationship as fiduciary. 88
Wn. 2d at 670, 565 P.2d at 799, whereas the court in In re Marriage of Dawley. 17
Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976), stated that parties "who are not
yet married are not presumed to share a confidential relationship." Id. at 355. 551 P.2d
at 331, 131 Cal. Rptr.at 11.
Some authorities fail to make a distinction between the terms confidential and fiduciary. See e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 275 (2d ed. 1977); Note, Use of
Non-Confidential Relationship Undue Influence in Contract Rescission, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 631, 632 (1974).

5. 88 Wn. 2d at 654, 565 P.2d at 793.
6. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293. 494 P.2d 201 (1972).
7. 44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954).
8. 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 201 (1972).
9. Statutes have been enacted with respect to only two types of marital agreements:
those concerning the disposition of community property to be effective on death,
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1976), and separation contracts, WASH. REV. CODE §
26.09.070 (1976). A combination of conveyance statutes and Washington case law
may also give a husband and wife "a right to deal in every possible manner with their
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court balanced various enumerated circumstances. Friedlander,however, shifted the emphasis of that test to one formally establishing certain of these circumstances as necessary elements of an enforceable
marital contract.
In Hamlin, an antenuptial agreement provided that property separately owned prior to marriage and property acquired during the marriage in the name of one spouse alone would retain its separate character subsequent to the marriage. 10 The husband, appointed
administrator of his wife's estate at her death, showed a small bank
account as the single asset of her estate. He claimed that pursuant to
the agreement, all other property was his separate property.11
The court stated that, to be valid, an antenuptial agreement must
reasonably provide for the wife, or the husband must disclose his
worth to her before she signs. 12 According to the court, because marriage creates a confidential relationship, the husband had the burden
of proving that his wife fully understood "the nature and significance
of the contract, and that she freely and voluntarily entered into it."' 13
The husband failed to meet that burden.
The Hamlin court examined many circumstances bearing upon the
fairness of an antenuptial contract, including the value of each party's
property, their children by prior marriages, the business experience of
each party, and who prepared the agreement. 1 4 The court did not reproperty," including changing by agreement, the separate status of property. Volz v.
Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 381, 94 P. 409, 410 (1920).

The Washington legislature, unlike other legislatures, has failed to enact provisions
covering antenuptial agreements. See 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS: HUSBAND

AND WIFE § 155 (1935). The bulk of antenuptial agreement legislation deals with requirements of form and recording.
10.
11.

44 Wn. 2d at 853-54, 272 P.2d at 126.
Id. at 856, 272 P.2d at 128. The husband had a successful importing and

wholesale business, the wife had significant property holdings, and each had children
by a prior marriage. Id. at 853-54, 272 P.2d at 126.
12. Id. at 864-65, 272 P.2d at 132, (citing Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257,
264, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1938), and 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 4, § 90). The court held
that the agreement was unfair because it allowed the husband unilaterally to place

community property in his own name. 44 Wn. 2d at 865-66, 272 P.2d at 132-33.
13. 44 Wn. 2d at 866-67, 272 P.2d at 133. Arguably, the Hamlin test is concerned
more with a disclosure of the rights involved in a marital agreement than with a de-

tailed property disclosure. See In re Estate of Madden, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280
(1934) (a spouse must know which rights are waived under a property settlement
agreement and must have some knowledge of the amount of the estate involved). A
subsequent case suggests that it may be unnecessary for a party to disclose essential
property information, as long as the other spouse knew at the time of marriage or
shortly thereafter that property was owned by the party prior to the marriage. In re
Estate ofBubb, 53 Wn. 2d 131, 134, 331 P.2d 859, 861 (1958).
14. 44 Wn. 2d at 866, 272 P.2d at 133.
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quire that each party be provided with independent legal or other advice, but weighed the availability and character of advice along with
the other enumerated circumstances. 15 In Friedlander,however, the
court shifted from the Hamlin balancing approach to a formalistic
analysis.
In Friedlander,the court reiterated the Hamlin test, but applied it
more rigidly. 16 It required first, that there be either a reasonable provision for the wife17 or a "full and fair disclosure of all material facts
15. The court expressly considered two circumstances omitted in 2 A. LINDEY,
supra note 4, § 90: who prepared the agreement, and the parties' business experience.
It also found that "[the wife] apparently was provided with no independent legal or
other advice." 44 Wn. 2d at 867, 272 P.2d at 133. It is obvious, therefore, that advice
was only one of several elements weighed, for if advice were a strict requirement, the
court could have made short shrift of the agreement.
The court previously declined to require independent advice in In re Estate of Madden, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934). The Madden court cited authority from another jurisdiction which included the prerequisite of competent and independent advice, and then considered whether the wife had relinquished her rights in the valuable
community property "without independent advice or advice from the deceased." Id. at
58, 28 P.2d at 283.
16. The Friedlanders executed an antenuptial agreement to avoid the type of difficulties encountered during the husband's prior marriage. 80 Wn. 2d at 301, 494 P.2d
at 213. The husband's attorney drafted an agreement designed to protect the separate
character of the husband's sizeable holdings. Prior to drafting the agreement. the attorney and the husband's brother, also an attorney, explained the intended provisions
to the wife. Id. at 302, 494 P.2d at 214.
17. The Washington Supreme Court recently recognized the fair and reasonable
provision standard as legitimate, even if only as an alternative. Whitney v. SeattleFirst Nat'l Bank, 90 Wn. 2d 105, 111, 579 P.2d 937 (1978). Arguably, the requirement
of a fair and reasonable provision should be omitted. What may be thought of as a reasonable provision at the time the agreement is executed may be found later to be highly
unreasonable. In the past the court had given great weight to the fact that a provision
distributed property disproportionately. In re Estate of Madden, 176 Wash. 51. 28 P.2d
280 (1934) (wife relinquished, for $1,000, her rights in property worth $8.000). Now,
however, disparate provisions are not conclusive indicators of unfairness. See, e.g., Halvorsen v. Halvorsen, 3 Wn. App. 827, 479 P.2d 161 (1970) (wife received only $500 a
month and assurances that the community's million-dollar tugboat enterprise, retained
by the husband, would go to a son); Peste v. Peste, 1 Wn. App. 19, 459 P.2d 70 (1969)
(pursuant to agreement, wife was awarded her personal effects, certain household furnishings, and $6600; husband received the balance of the community property, including a partnership admittedly valued at at least $100,000). See also Canter v. Palmer.
166 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1964) (active misrepresentation rather than disproportionate provisions warranted setting aside an antenuptial agreement); In re Estate of West. 194 Kan.
736, 402 P.2d 117 (1965) (valid agreement where husband's property was in excess of
$460,000 while the wife's provision was for $27,000); Rocker v. Rocker, 13 Ohio Misc.
199, 232 N.E.2d 445 (1967) (provision for wife one-fifth the size of husband's estate,
worth approximately $50,000, was not wholly disproportionate). Contra, Del Vecchio v.
Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (court may consider whether provisions would
enable spouse to live in a manner reasonably in concert with the way of life before dissolution, and at least as comfortably as life before marriage); In re Estate of Vallish,
431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968) (antenuptial agreement which failed to provide for the
wife was invalid unless a full disclosure was made of the decedent's assets); Walls.
Agreements as to the Characterof Property, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY DESK-
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relating to the amount, character and value of the property involved,"' 8 and second, that there be independent advice for the prospective spouse who is giving up his or her rights. 19 According to the
court, the husband satisfied neither requirement; the agreement was
therefore void.2 0 It is upon the unsettled base of Hamlin and Friedlander that Hadley rests.
II.

ANALYSIS OF HADLEY

Hadley adds to the confusion surrounding marital agreement standards by failing to clarify the test practitioners must meet to draft an
enforceable agreement. 2 1 If the equities of Hadley and Friedlander
are considered, it may be contended that the wife in Hadley was far
more deserving of judicial relief from her agreement than was the wife
BOOK § 18.4 (1977) (courts will look very carefully at agreements which make a provision for one spouse that is greatly disproportionate to the provision made for the other).
18. 80 Wn. 2d at 302, 494 P.2d at 214. A limit was imposed on disclosure, in that
a spouse need not know "the exact financial status of the other spouse's resources." Id.
19. Id. at 303,494 P.2d at 214.
20. Id.
21. The Hadley court implied that one standard governs both antenuptial and postnuptial agreements. The parties in Hadley both urged that Hamlin and Friedlander,
which dealt with antenuptial agreements, also applied to an agreement made during
the marriage. 88 Wn. 2d at 654, 565 P.2d at 793. It was of little consequence to the
majority in Hadley that the agreements, executed for estate planning, were used in dissolution proceedings.
One can argue that only one standard should govern marital agreements. With more
than one out of three marriages ending in divorce, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (1975), a party
should recognize the risk that a marriage could end in dissolution, and that an agreement entered into prior to separation may be used to establish the rights of the parties
in the dissolution proceedings.
Washington has declined to hold that the validity of a marital contract in a particular situation depends upon the date the parties executed the agreement in relation to
the date of the parties' marriage. The court in Hamlin found that the rule of good
faith applicable to antenuptial contracts corresponded "to the same kind of test for
fair dealing this court has required of a husband who had contracted with his wife
after marriage with respect to their property rights." 44 Wn. 2d at 865, 272 P.2d at
132. Cf. In re Estate of Nelson, 85 Wn. 2d 602, 537 P.2d 765 (1975) (separation
agreements survive the death of one of the parties unless it can be proven that that
was not the parties' intent); In re Estate of Bubb, 53 Wn. 2d 131, 331 P.2d 859 (1958)
(separation agreement used in probate proceeding). Contra, Friedlander,80 Wn. 2d at
298, 494 P.2d at 212 ("It is significant that the transaction involved a prenuptialagree,nent as distinguished from a postnuptial or separation agreement.") (emphasis in
original).
See generally Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 406 (1977); Walls, supra note 17, § 18.11, at 18-8. The Hamlin and
Friedlanderrequirements are probably as applicable after marriage as before. Although
their independent counsel requirement was then inapplicable to postnuptial agreements,
it has been suggested that where there are disproportionate provisions, independent
advisers should be employed. Id.
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in Friedlander.The wife in Hadley was arguably naive concerning the
marital contractual transaction 22 while the wife in Friedlanderwas intelligent and skilled in business. 23 The Hadley court could have continued applying the formalistic Friedlandertest and voided the agreements. In effect, Hadley suspends the stringent test of Friedlander;yet
the court's use of language reminiscent of Friedlanderleaves doubts
whether the suspension will be permanent.
In Hadley, the court stated that the Friedlandertest applied. It then
determined the validity of the property status agreement by examining
"(1) whether full disclosure has been made by the respondent of the
amount, character and value of the property involved, and (2)
whether the agreement was entered into fully and voluntarily on inde24
pendent advice and with full knowledge by the spouse of her rights."
The court, however, merely reiterated the formal Friedlander test,
and then proceeded to apply a Hamlin ad hoc balancing approach,
considering all circumstances of the case. In Friedlander,the court set
forth the circumstances surrounding the transaction which caused the
agreement to fail to comply with the standards of full disclosure and
independent advice. Those circumstances in Friedlander can be
profitably compared with those in Hadley which, however minimally,
satisfied the test.
First, Friedlanderrejected the proposition that an agreement only
generally referring to a spouse's property and assets meets the full disclosure requirement. 25 In Hadley, however, a general disclosure was
sufficient. The husband's disclosure consisted of merely informing his
wife of developments after she had travelled to his major businesses. 26
The record omitted any indication that the information supplied by
the husband dealt with specific property values or changes of character in the property. The majority failed, as pointed out by the dissent,
22. The court mentions only the age, health, and premarital financial status of the
wife, 88 Wn. 2d at 651, 565 P.2d at 791, without discussing her intelligence, education,
or business experience, as it did in Friedlander,see note 23 infra, and Hamlin, see
note 14 and accompanying text supra.
23. At the time of appeal the wife was within two quarters of completing her fine
arts degree and was operating a promising art gallery business. 80 Wn. 2d at 298. 494
P.2d at 211.
24. 88 Wn. 2d at 654, 565 P.2d at 793.
25. 80 Wn. 2d at 302,494 P.2d at 214.
26. 88 Wn. 2d at 655, 565 P.2d at 793. The trial court found that the agreements
had been based on a study conducted by a certified public accountant and an attorney
which characterized the assets and their respective sources. The record is unclear as to
whether this study was shown or explained to the wife.
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to require in clear and direct terms that "all material facts" be disclosed.2 7 The general disclosure of financial status permitted by Hadley is less informative than the articulated full disclosure requirement
and could prevent a spouse from realizing that he or she waived a
claim to property characterized as separate pursuant to an agreement.
Second, Hadley also plainly departs from the Friedlanderindependent advice principle. The wife in Friedlanderlacked independent advice, although the family attorney had informed her of the general nature and effect of the agreement. 28 A combination of two elements
satisfied the independent advice standard in Hadley, although neither
element standing alone would have met the Friedlanderindependent
advice concept. First, the wife in Hadley obtained advice from the
counsel who handled the family's business affairs and who drafted the
agreements.2 9 Similar advice was insufficient in Friedlander.Second,
27. Id. at 666, 667, 565 P.2d at 799, 800. The dissent stated that the wife failed
to receive information that the agreements could be used for dissolution proceedings
in addition to estate planning purposes. The dissent also indicated that the independent
attorney was unable to advise the wife because he lacked necessary information and
the wife "didn't have that information." Id. at 667, 565 P.2d at 800.
28. 80 Wn. 2d at 302, 494 P.2d at 214. The husband's brother, an attorney, informed the wife in the same manner. Id.
29. 88 Wn. 2d at 655, 565 P.2d at 793. The wife had spoken highly of the lawyer.
Ethically, advice sanctioned in Hadley may be inconsistent with the attorney's professional responsibility. The question of whether the lawyer can, when requested, represent both parties in marital relationships has been raised. Rieke, The Dissolution Act
of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV. 385 (1974). Washington courts
have often given an affirmative answer. See Lee v. Lee, 27 Wn. 2d 389, 178 P.2d 296
(1947) (an attorney, previously unacquainted with either party, drafted a valid property settlement conveyance and agreement releasing the husband of all obligations to
his wife, despite the husband's lack of separate advice); Halvorsen v. Halvorsen, 3 Wn.
App. 827, 830, 479 P.2d 161, 163 (1970) (wife's family attorney, at her request, prepared a valid property settlement, although she had been under a psychiatrist's care;
she had been told "that she could obtain independent counsel and ought to do so if she
felt a conflict of interest existed"); Peste v. Peste, 1 Wn. App. 19, 22, 459 P.2d 70,
73 (1969) (property settlement agreement was valid where the wife had been "repeatedly and independently advised by a number of people . . . 'to get her own attorney' "). In Halvorsen, it was pointed out that such representation may cause difficulties. 3 Wn. App. at 830, 479 P.2d at 163. The attorney must depend on his or her
own conscience to satisfactorily eliminate conflicts of interest. Canon 5 of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer should exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client. A lawyer "must weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the employment." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15. This

is particularly true in a marital situation, in which one attorney is likely to have represented both parties in the past. The lawyer may represent both parties "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the
exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each." ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C). See generally Aronson, Conflict of
Interest, 52 WASH. L. Rv. 807, 826-27 (1977).
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the wife in Hadley consulted but failed to obtain advice from an independent attorney. Her consultation added nothing to the advice received from the family attorney and would also have been inadequate
to satisfy the strict Friedlandertest. 30
Arguably, Hadley followed Hamlin in taking account of independent advice as one of many circumstances to be considered, rather
than making such advice a formal requirement. Other jurisdictions
also take a balancing approach, weighing various circumstances. 31
Courts may look at the general and approximate knowledge one
spouse has of the other's property, 32 and whether the property is complicated in nature. 33 The relative situations of the parties, including
35
their ages, experiences, health, family ties, 34 and geographic ties,
30. It may be contended that advice rendered by someone other than an attorney
would be sufficient. See Hamlin, 44 Wn. 2d at 867, 272 P.2d at 133 (the wife "was
provided with no independent legal or other advice." (emphasis added)). Impliedly.
a spouse's family member may give adequate advice. Brewer v. Brewer, 84 Ohio App.
35, 78 N.E.2d 919, 921-22 (1948) (separation agreement struck down when husband
deprived his wife of the opportunity to seek independent advice from her family or
from counsel when the advice would have been of real assistance to her in deciding
whether to enter into a separation agreement). Any competent advice may also suffice.
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
31.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Sayegh, 118 Cal. App. 2d 327. 257 P.2d 995 (1953)
("independent advice of counsel is not essential but is a circumstance to be considered
in determining the validity of an antenuptial agreement"); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio.
143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962) (competent and independent advice is preferable, but
not necessarily a required prerequisite to a free and voluntary signing); Sande v. Sande.
83 Idaho 233, 360 P.2d 998, 1003 (1961) (rule against enforcing agreements which
are unfair because of overreaching is "especially applicable where the wife was ignorant of her rights, and acted without independent counsel," but is "not necessarily so
limited"); Brewer v. Brewer, 84 Ohio App. 35, 78 N.E.2d 919 (1948); Pniewski v.
Przybysz, 183 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (antenuptial agreement held valid
despite protests of husband, who understood little or no English, but who had considerable business experience and who had the agreement read to him in his own
language; dicta: independent advice, applicable only to the wife, does not exist as a
requirement in the law).
See also Whitney v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 16 Wn. App. 905, 560 P.2d 360 (1977).
aff'd, 90 Wn. 2d 105, 579 P.2d 937 (1978). In Whitney, the appellate court stated that
the requirement that independent advice must be sought or that a recommendation to
seek independent counsel be expressed is "only one factor to be considered in the fairness of the overall transaction." Id. at 909, 560 P.2d at 364. The transaction in Whitney
involved an agreement executed coextensively with the execution of wills by the wife
and her late husband. All documents contained terms contrary to the wife's expectations, but were held valid. Id.
32. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962); In re Estate of
Gelb, 425 Pa. 117, 228 A.2d 367, 372 (1967) (dissenting opinion) (majority held
that decedent grossly misrepresented his assets, worth in excess of $260,000, rather
than $100,000 as stated in the antenuptial agreement).
33. Estate of Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750, 757 (Mo. 1970) (assets of decedent, consisting of a 240-acre farm, were of a simple and uncomplicated
nature).
34. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962).
35. Estate of Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750, 757 (Mo. 1970) (both
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may be examined. In addition, courts may take into account the existence of children by prior marriages, the wife's independent means,
36
and the intelligence of the parties.
The Hadley court considered only a few of the criteria stated
above: the general knowledge of the wife concerning the husband's
property, the parties' ages, and their health.3 7 The court emphasized
instead the reliance of the husband and third parties on the agreements. The majority found justifiable reliance because the wife incorporated the agreements in her will and she waited until a late date to
38
contest their validity.
The dissent pointed out that reliance by a spouse should not be
considered in determining whether a marital agreement was entered
into voluntarily by both parties.3 9 A husband is under a duty to make
a full disclosure to his wife. The majority's position allows him to circumvent his duty if he receives an enforceable agreement merely by
obtaining his wife's signature on the agreement without making a full
disclosure to her and then taking some action in reliance on the agreement. According to the dissent, the husband gave the wife inadequate
40
information and therefore unjustifiably relied upon the agreements.
Although the same test was stated in both cases, Hadley required
the husband to comply with only minimal duties when compared with
Friedlander.Hadley allows a spouse to enforce an agreement when he
or she makes a general disclosure of assets to the other spouse and the
other spouse has had an opportunity to receive independent advice,
but has not in fact done so. In addition, it allows those circumstances
to be balanced with others to determine whether there was a fair marital agreement.
parties to an antenuptial agreement reared their families and accumulated their prop-

erty in the same rural community).
36. Hamlin, 44 Wn. 2d at 866, 272 P.2d at'133; In re Estate of Gelb, 425 Pa. 117,
228 A.2d 367, 372 (1967) (dissenting opinion).

37.

88 Wn. 2d at 651, 655, 565 P.2d at 791, 793.

38.

Id. at 655, 565 P.2d at 793. A survey of the applicable Washington case law

failed to disclose any prior cases in which reliance was the determinative factor. Id.

39. Id. at 669, 565 P.2d at 801. The dissent did not speculate on whether "an estoppel could be urged in specific cases as to third persons," because the record showed
no justifiable reliance by third persons. Id.
40. Id. at 669, 565 P.2d at 801. See Leonard v. Washington Employers, Inc., 77
Wn. 2d 271, 461 P.2d 538 (1969). In Leonard, the court stated that equitable estoppel
is inapplicable where both parties have the same* means of ascertaining the truth.
Equitable estoppel would, however, apply to a spouse with access to the truth who
attempted to enforce an agreement upon an uninformed spouse who was without
means of ascertaining the truth. Id. at 280, 461 P.2d at 544.
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SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW

Hadley satisfied neither those practitioners who have relied upon
the stringent Friedlandertest nor those desiring a new, less demand-

ing test of validity. The court created great confusion by failing to
make explicit its ad hoc approach. The confusion is evidenced by the
decisions in In re Cohn41 and Whitney v. Seattle-FirstNational Bank.42
In Cohn, the court of appeals applied the validity standards less
rigidly than did the supreme court in Hamlin and Hadley, and far less
rigidly than it did in Friedlander.The Cohn court stated that the full
disclosure requirement is met if the wife had knowledge of the exact

financial status of her husband's resources or the "circumstances were
such that she reasonably could have had such knowledge." 43 The

court then examined the plaintiff wife's ability to determine intelligently that she desired to enter into an antenuptial contract and concluded that she could have had knowledge of her husband's resources.
It considered the couple's meretricious relationship prior to the agreement 44 and the wife's intelligence. 45 The court stated that the
husband's financial status had been discussed to such a degree that the
attorney had enough information to draft the agreement, implying
that the wife also should have had enough information. To bolster its

conclusion, the court noted that the agreement referred to a tax loss
involving a carry-over of separate funds, and that material relating to
the husband's separate property was left in the house in a desk acces46
sible to both parties.
41. 18 Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79(1977).
42. 90 Wn. 2d 105, 579 P.2d 937 (1978). See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
43. Id. at 508, 569 P.2d at 83. The court suggested that Hadley and Friedlander
subscribed to the proposition that sufficient disclosure occurs when there is circumstantial evidence indicating that one spouse reasonably should know the exact financial
status of the other. Id. at 507, 569 P.2d at 82. Arguably, this reduces the quantum of
proof necessary to meet the burden of proof imposed on the husband by R.C.W. § 26.16.2 10, which provides that " [i] n every case, where any question arises as to the good
faith of any transaction between husband and wife, whether a transaction between them
directly or by intervention of third person or persons, the burden of proof shall be on the
party asserting the good faith." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.210 (1976). For support of
tests similar to Cohn, see Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (1962) (wife bound
by antenuptial agreement notwithstanding the husband's failure to disclose if "she had
or reasonably should have had a general and approximate knowledge of the character
and extent of his property"): 2 A. LINDEY. supra note 4. § 90. at 84. cited in Friedlader.
80 Wn. 2d at 300, 494 P.2d at 213.
44. 18 Wn. App. at 508, 569 P.2d at 83.
45. Id. at 503, 569 P.2d at 80. The wife had completed approximately two-thirds
of a bachelor's degree.
46. Id. at 508, 569 P.2d at 83.
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Neither Friedlandernor Hadley held that accessibility to pertinent
information satisfies the disclosure standard. In Cohn, however, the
court of appeals suggested that a spouse must affirmatively seek information to be protected by the disclosure standards. The court also unexpectedly referred to independent advice as advice that, if given, is
from an independent party. 47 Friedlanderand Hadley required some
contact with an independent source of advice, but the appellate court
in Cohn rejected that requirement in cases where advice is neither
provided by one spouse nor sought and obtained by the other.
Cohn is an example of a divergent interpretation resulting from the
lack of clarity in Hadley. In Whitney, however, the Washington Supreme Court attempted to make Hamlin, Friedlander, and Hadley
consistent. 48 The court stated that there are alternative methods for
obtaining a valid agreement executed between spouses or prospective
spouses, reiterating the Hamlin standards. If the agreement is fair and
reasonable, the Whitney court held that there is no absolute requirement of "competent, independent advice of counsel, or that [a
''49
spouse] be specifically informed of [the] right to seek the same.
Thus, far from making the law harmonious, the unanimous Whitney
court left unanswered the critical question raised by Hadley and Cohn
as to what constitutes independent counsel and full disclosure. 50
IV.

CONCLUSION

Hadley relaxed the formal requirements applied to validate property status agreements executed between a husband and wife. The
court failed to articulate its actual test, consisting of an ad hoc determination of fairness. Individuals in a marital or antenuptial
confidential relationship should be allowed to plan for the future with
a degree of certainty. 5 ' The court may facilitate marital planning ei47. Id. at 509, 569 P.2d at 83.
48. 90 Wn. 2d at 109-10, 579 P.2d at 939.
49. Id. at 111, 579 P.2d at 940.
50. The court failed entirely to mention Cohn, and failed to examine the sufficency of advice and disclosure upheld in Hadley.
51. In the past, however, the court has pointed out that there is a strong state interest in controlling separation agreements which may militate against self-determination by the contracting couple. Decker v. Decker, 52 Wn. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332
(1959). The court stated,
Certain language in some marital-relations decisions of this and other courts appears to emphasize unduly the contractual rights of the parties in the settlement
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ther by actually applying the test stated in Hadley and Friedlanderor
by enunciating a less rigid balancing approach enumerating the circumstances it will consider.
Bruce Judd

of their marital difficulties by agreement or contract ...
It is clear that the parties to a divorce action cannot foreclose the public interest in their marital responsibilities by a contract or agreement of settlement.
Id. at 464-65, 326 P.2d at 336-37 (dictum). See Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124. 42
N.W.2d 500. 501 (1951) ("There are three parties to a marriage contract-the husband. the wife, and the state."). But see Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972). In Posner, the court recognized
that the sanctity of marriage has greatly eroded, in spite of the state's vital interest.
It held that antenuptial agreements settling alimony and property rights of the parties
upon divorce are not void ab initio as against public policy. Id.
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